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Abstract
How can humans and machines learn to make joint decisions? This has become an important
question in domains such as medicine, law and finance. We approach the question from a
theoretical perspective and formalize our intuitions about human-machine decision making in a
non-symmetric bandit model. In doing so, we follow the example of a doctor who is assisted by
a computer program. We show that in our model, exploration is generally hard. In particular,
unless one is willing to make assumptions about how human and machine interact, the machine
cannot explore efficiently. We highlight one such assumption, policy space independence, which
resolves the coordination problem and allows both players to explore independently. Our results
shed light on the fundamental difficulties faced by the interaction of humans and machines. We
also discuss practical implications for the design of algorithmic decision systems.
1 Introduction
As machine learning algorithms have become on par or even superior to humans in a number of
decision making problems (Rajpurkar et al., 2017; Silver et al., 2018), the idea that humans might be
assisted by computer programs across a large variety of tasks has gained momentum. Already today,
automated decision making systems are being used to predict cardiac arrests, credit scores, and
recidivism (Tonekaboni et al., 2018; Board of Governors, 2007; Angwin et al., 2016). An emerging
literature asks how humans, who often remain the final decision makers, can and should interact
with such systems (Tonekaboni et al., 2019; Lucic et al., 2020). Machine learners, in turn, want to
understand how algorithms should be designed such that interaction with humans is as fruitful as
possible (Carroll et al., 2019).
In most real-world decision making problems, humans have access to information that is un-
observable to any algorithm. In the medical domain, doctors can obtain important information
from personal interaction with patients (Goldenberg and Engelhardt, 2019). In judicial bail, judges
may base their decision on the behavior of the defendant in the courtroom (Lakkaraju et al., 2017).
From a machine learning point of view, such unobserved variables arise not due to a failure of the
algorithm’s designer to collect them. Instead, it is a property of many real-world decision problems
that formulating all relevant aspects as inputs to an algorithm is impossible.
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Figure 1: Through learning optimal policies f and g, human and machine learn how to interact in
order to best decide.
In a similar spirit, an algorithmic decision maker (a “machine”) can base its decisions on large
quantities of data that are effectively unobservable to any human. In the medical domain, an
algorithm might have access to a patient’s full medical history or genome data. In credit scoring, an
algorithm can look for patterns in a large historical record. Even if a human decision maker could
survey all those variables in principle, this is practically infeasible.
How should we understand decision making when two decision makers, both of
whom observe different aspects of the problem at hand, jointly make a decision? What
would it mean for them to be efficient, and are there theoretical limitations on how
well any computer program can assist a human decision maker? In this work, we
make a first step towards answering these questions. To this end, we propose a contextual bandit
model with two players, the human and the machine (see Figure 1). In every round, both players
privately obtain contextual information that cannot be shared. Players need to coordinate a single
action — a treatment, a credit or a judgement to give. To do so the first player (the machine)
makes a “recommendation” to the second player (the human). Depending on the application, this
recommendation could be an action, a ranking over all possible actions, or a summary of the
received context. Given the recommendation made by the first player, as well as her own contextual
information, the second player decides on an action. Conditional on context and the chosen action,
a reward signal is obtained. Action and reward signal are observed by both players, and they share
the same goal, to maximize the obtained rewards.
Our running example is that of a medical doctor who receives a summary of patient
statistics, together with concrete recommendations on what tests to run, treatments to give or
surgeries to perform. The doctor has side information and needs to decide how to act, while the
machine needs to learn how to best advise the doctor. As the example suggests, our model is not
symmetric — the action is solely determined by the second player.
There are two aspects where learning comes into the picture. The first player (the machine)
is supposed to learn which recommendations to make; the second player (the human)
is supposed to learn how to “interpret” the machine’s recommendations and, combined
with her own context, come to good final decisions. The two players are coupled: the final
decision of the human decides on the joint reward of both players. From a more technical point of
view, our setup can be described as a dynamic decision problem with contextual information and
imperfect feedback. Modelling this decision problem as a bandit problem is necessary if we want to
understand how the two players can improve their decision rules over time (Kilbertus et al., 2019).
We analyze the proposed contextual bandit model in terms of the expected minimax regret that
human and machine can hope to achieve. To do so, we assume that both players have access to a
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finite set of policies. Over time, they try to identify their optimal policies, that is the two decision
rules that work best together. In our model, we can compare the performance of human and machine
to a hypothetical single decision maker who has access to all contextual information and both policy
spaces. For such a single decision maker with N policies, it is known that the expected regret is of
order O(
√
TK ln(N)) (Auer et al., 2002). This allows us to analyze how much harder the contextual
bandit problem becomes by transferring from a single to two separated decision makers who cannot
share their complete contexts and interact in a non-symmetric manner. Apart from suggesting a
bandit model for human-machine learning, our main contributions are the following.
• In Section 4, we show that our problem admits a worst-case lower bound of order O(√TN1),
where N1 is the number of policies of the first player (the machine). Intuitively, this means
that the machine cannot explore efficiently: essentially, it needs to systematically
perform trial and error on all its policies before it has learned how to optimally
advise the human.
• In Section 5, we introduce the P2-EXP4 algorithm, a variant of EXP4. It allows to upper
bound the minimax regret by
√
2TKN1 ln(N1N2), where N2 is the number of policies of the
second player (the human). Intuitively, this means that subject to the constraints faced by
the machine, the human can explore efficiently: if the human tries to find the optimal
decisions as the EXP4 algorithm suggests, she can learn within few steps how to interpret a
single policy of the machine.
• In Section 6, we turn to the special case of treatment recommendations, where the machine
directly recommends the human which actions to take. We conjecture that joint exploration
under treatment recommendations is as hard as in the general case.
• In Section 7, we ask whether we can make additional assumptions, for example on the
type of interactions between the human and the machine, such that exploration becomes
more efficient than in the worst case. We introduce one such assumption — policy space
independence — under which the two players can obtain an efficient expected regret of√
8T max{K, |R|} ln(max{N1, N2}).
All in all, our paper provides a first step towards a formal analysis of computer-assisted decision
making, as it is used in many fields, particularly in medicine. We believe that such a formal analysis
can provide important insights into the design of such systems, and help define our expectations of
what is possible under which assumptions.
2 Our model: The computer reports to the human, who then de-
cides
Our formal model is a contextual bandit model with two players, depicted in Figure 2. In round
t = 1, . . . , T , Player 1 (the machine) first observes context xt ∈ X . Player 1 then chooses a
recommendation rt ∈ R, potentially at random. Here, R is the space of all possible recommendations
that the first player can make. Next, Player 2 (the human) observes context zt ∈ Z and the chosen
recommendation rt. Player 2 then, potentially at random, chooses an action at ∈ A. This action is
revealed to both players, and they receive a reward signal yt ∈ [0, 1]. Here X and Z are arbitrary
spaces of private contexts (one for each player), and A = {1, . . . ,K} is a finite set of K actions.
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In round t = 1, ..., T
1. Context xt ∈ X is revealed to Player 1
2. Player 1 decides on a recommendation rt ∈ R
3. Context zt ∈ Z and recommendation rt are revealed to Player 2
4. Player 2 decides on an action at ∈ A
5. Reward yt ∈ [0, 1] and action at are revealed to both players
Figure 2: Interaction in the contextual bandit model with two players.
2.1 Formal setup
We endow both players with a finite set of policies, and want them to find the optimal combination.
Thus, let Π1 ⊆ RX be a finite set of policies for the first player, and Π2 ⊆ AR×Z a finite set of
policies for the second player. Given two policies f ∈ Π1 and g ∈ Π2, we obtain the resulting joint
policy pi(x, z) = g(f(x), z). This joint policy is a complete decision rule for the problem, translating
context into actions. Let Π = Π2 × Π1 be the space of all combinations of policies that the two
players can possibly realize. For a tuple pi = (g, f) ∈ Π, we slightly abuse notation and write
pi(x, z) = g(f(x), z) to refer to the corresponding joint policy.1 Moreover, we denote the number of
policies by N1 = |Π1| and N2 = |Π2|. By construction, we have N = |Π| = N1N2.
An algorithm for the two players is a pair A = (A1, A2). Here A1 = (A1,t)Tt=1 and A2 = (A2,t)Tt=1
are two collections of measurable functions that specify the decision rules of both players at all points
in time. Note that the domains of these functions specify which variables are observable to which
player at what time. Thus, A1,t is a function of x1, . . . , xt, whereas A2,t is a function of z1, . . . , zt.
The details of this can be found in Supplement A.
Let D be a probability distribution over X × Z × [0, 1]A. We consider an i.i.d. contextual
bandit model where context/context/reward tuples (xt, zt, Yt) are i.i.d. draws from D. Let Y (pi) =
E(x,z,Y )∼D [Y (pi(x, z))] be the expected reward of a joint policy pi. Let pi? ∈ arg maxpi∈Π Y (pi) be a
policy combination that maximizes the expected reward. The expected regret after T rounds is given
by RegT = E
[
T Y (pi?)−∑Tt=1 Yt(at)], where the expectation is over D and the randomly selected
actions and recommendations. The central quantity of analysis is the worst-case or minimax regret,
given by RT = infA supD sup|Π1|=N1 sup|Π2|=N2 RegT .
2.2 First thoughts on our model
What makes the model difficult? For both players, the difficulty arises from the fact that
contextual information and policy space of the other player are unknown. This complicates the
coordination problem faced by the two players. Each player would like to find the optimal policy
that works best with the other player. This is difficult because knowledge about the other player’s
decision problem is limited. Intuitively, Player 1 does not know which actions Player 2 would
have chosen had he chosen different recommendations. Similarly, Player 2 does not know which
recommendations Player 1 considered but decided against.
Worst-case analysis. The reader who is not accustomed with bandits might wonder about the
1Depending on Π1 and Π2, different tuples (g, f) can give rise to the same policy pi : X × Z → A.
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minimax regret. Intuitively, a strategy of the two players might work well for some decision problems
and fail for others. Considering the minimax regret means that we would like to find guarantees
that can be achieved under all possible circumstances. That said, it is interesting to ask how
much better the two players can do if we assume that the decision problem is ’benign’ – a question
that we address in Section 7.
The space of recommendations R. A rather interesting role is played by the space of
recommendations R. This is the interface by which the first player can transmit information to
the second player. For the first player, it is similar to an action space. For the second player, it
resembles contextual information. Should we think of R as being relatively small, consisting of a
limited number of actions, or as relatively large, resembling contextual information? Turning to the
example of our doctor: On one hand, we might want the machine to provide the doctor with as much
information as possible. On the other hand, a small space of recommendations equal to the space
of actions corresponds to the important case of treatment recommendations, where the machine
directly suggests the doctor what to do. In Sections 3-5 we consider large recommendation
spaces and assume that R is unrestricted. We turn to the special case of treatment
recommendations in Section 6.
3 Two baselines for the expected regret
The obvious question is: How well can we expect the two players to coordinate? For one, we would
like to know the strategies used by both players. Moreover, we are interested in the expected regret
that they are able to obtain. A first baseline on what we might hope the two players to achieve at
all is given by the performance of an omnipresent decision maker who has access to all contextual
information and both policy spaces. Such an omnipresent decision maker can obtain an expected
regret of
√
2TK ln(N1N2). A second baseline is given by the simple coordination strategy where
players naively try all policy combinations. This allows the two players to bound the expected regret
by O(
√
TN1N2 lnT ).
In the following sections, we address the question whether the two players can do better than
what is suggested by the simple coordination strategy. Comparing with the performance of the
omnipresent decision maker, the question becomes whether it is possible to move N1 and
N2 inside the logarithm, perhaps at the expense of a factor of K. Why is this important? A
regret bound of order O(
√
N) means that the policy space is not dealt with efficiently. It corresponds
to systematic trial and error on every single policy. Quite to the contrary, a regret bound of order
O(
√
lnN) means that the decision maker can compare many policies simultaneously. It also prepares
the way to deal with infinite policy spaces (Beygelzimer et al., 2010).
In the follwoing Section 4, we focus on the problem of the machine, and show that its ability to
explore is limited to the naive strategy (Theorem 2). In Section 5, we consider the scenario where
doctor and machine explore together. Given that the problem of the machine is already known to be
hard, a human who can tell the machine which policy to use can explore efficiently (Theorem 3).
3.1 Comparison against an omnipresent decision maker
A first baseline on the expected regret that we might hope the two players to achieve is given by the
performance of an omnipresent decision maker. An omnipresent decision maker observes contextual
information (xt, zt) ∈ X ×Z and has access to policy space Π = Π2×Π1. This is an i.i.d. contextual
bandit problem. Since we are only concerned with statistical optimality (and set computational
concerns aside), our natural benchmark is the onmipresent decision maker with policy
space Π using the EXP4 algorithm, obtaining an expected regret of
√
2TK lnN (Auer
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et al., 2002; Lattimore and Szepesvari, 2019).2 The EXP4 algorithm (reproduced in Supplement
Figure D.1) maintains a probability distribution over Π and samples actions according to it. In every
round, this distribution is updated using an exponential weighting scheme and importance-weighted
reward estimates. Every strategy for the two players in our model gives rise to a strategy for an
omnipresent decision maker. Therefore,
√
2TK ln(N1N2) is a first baseline on what we might expect
the two players in our model to achieve at all.
3.2 Naively trying all policy combinations
A second baseline on the expected regret, and something that the two players can actually achieve, is
obtained if both players treat policies in the combined policy space Π as separate arms of a stochastic
bandit. For this, note that the number of policies of both players is common knowledge.
Proposition 1. (Regret obtained by naively trying all policy combinations) By treating all
policies in the combined policy space Π as separate arms of a stochastic bandit,
RT ≤ O
(√
TN1N2 lnT
)
.
Players make use of 1-UCB (Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012). The formal proof is in Supplement
B.
4 A fundamental lower bound for the machine
Before we turn to the full problem of human-machine learning, we focus on the problem of the
machine. Interestingly, it turns out that the machine cannot improve upon the naive learning strategy
of Proposition 1. For intuition, consider our example doctor who is assisted by a machine. To isolate
the problem of the machine, assume for a moment that the doctor does not even attempt to learn:
Given the machine recommendation rt and her contextual information zt, the doctor already knows
what to do. Formally, this means that Π2 consists of a single policy. Still, the machine has N1
different policies and wants to figure out how to best advise the doctor. As the following theorem
shows, the machine has to solve a bandit problem that depends not on the number of actions K, but
on the size of the space of recommendations R and the number of policies N1. Intuitively, this is
because the human intermediates between recommendations and actions, using an unknown policy
and additional context. As discussed above, we think of the space of recommendations as being
large, to allow the machine to communicate a large variety of information. Intuitively, Theorem 2
shows that exploration for the machine is hard even if the doctor sticks to a single policy. Formally,
it is a worst-case lower bound.
Theorem 2. (Lower bound in the number of policies of the first player) Assume that
Player 2 only plays actions that are suggested by policies in Π2. Let N2 = 1, K = 2 and |R| ≥ N1.
There exists a universal constant c > 0 such that
RT ≥ c
√
TN1.
Two formal proofs are presented in Supplement C. Both show that Player 1 has to solve an
N1-armed Bernoulli bandit. The first proof uses the fact that Player 1 does not know the context
vector of Player 2. Here the context vector of Player 2 can contain the payoffs of all arms of the
2Asymptotically, this is the best known result for i.i.d. contextual bandits. For adversarial contextual bandits, it
has been shown to be tight up to a factor lnK by Seldin and Lugosi (2016).
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Algorithm P2-EXP4
Parameters: η > 0, γ > 0
Initialization: Matrix Q1 ∈ [0, 1]N1×N2 with Q1,ij = 1N1N2
For each t = 1, ..., T
1. Player 2 tells Player 1 to play policy it according to qti =
∑N2
j=1Qt,ij
2. Player 1 receives context xt and recommends rt = fit(xt)
3. Player 2 chooses action at according to (1)
4. Players receive reward yt and Player 2 estimates yˆtk = 1− 1{at=k}qt,itptk+γ (1− yt)
5. Player 2 propagates rewards to experts Yˆt,ij = 1{it 6=i} + 1{it=i}yˆt,gj(rt,zt)
6. Player 2 updates Qt using exponential weighting
Qt+1,ij =
exp(ηYˆt,ij)Qt,ij∑
l,m exp(η(Yˆt,lm)Qt,lm
Figure 3: The P2-EXP4 algorithm allows the second player to explore efficiently.
Bernoulli bandit. The second proof uses the fact that Player 1 does not know the policy of Player
2. Here the policy of Player 2 can implicitly encode the payoffs of all arms of the Bernoulli bandit
– and both players can observe the same context. To sum up, the lower bound in Theorem 2
holds if either context or policy space of Player 2 are unknown to Player 1.3
At this point, the reader might be worried by the fact that we controlled Player 2. In Supplement
G, we state a problem class that allows the second player to choose actions arbitrarily.
5 Efficient exploration for a human who controls the machine
We now consider the full problem of human-machine learning, where the second player has multiple
policies. Consider again the doctor who is advised by a machine. The doctor tries to figure
out how to act on machine advice. At the same time, the machine tries to determine
how to advise the doctor. How should the two players coordinate? Is it even possible that both
explore simultaneously? From Theorem 1, we already know that exploration is hard for the machine,
even if the doctor sticks to a single policy. Thus, the question becomes whether the second player
can explore efficiently. The P2-EXP4 (Player 2-EXP4) algorithm, depicted in Figure 3, shows that
this is indeed the case. For coordination, we allow the human to tell the machine which
policy to use. Intuitively, the doctor tries to figure out which of the N1 different programs that
the machine can run works best. Theorem 3 states that P2-EXP4 essentially allows to match the
lower bound in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. (Logarithmic regret in the number of policies of the second player) The
P2-EXP4 algorithm, with η =
√
2 log(N1N2)/(TKN1) and γ = 0, satisfies
RT ≤
√
2TKN1 ln(N1N2).
3From a theoretical point of view this might not be surprising. What really matters are the expert predictions
that result from the interaction of context and policy (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006).
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We describe the intuition behind P2-EXP4, the proof is in Supplement D. In P2-EXP4, Player
2 maintains a probability distribution Qt over the space of all policies Π. In round t, Player 2
chooses a policy fit for Player 1 by drawing it from the marginal distribution of Qt over Π1. After
obtaining recommendation rt and context zt, Player 2 draws at according to the induced probability
distribution over actions
P(at = k) = ptk with ptk =
∑N2
j=1Qt,it,j1{gj(rt,zt)=k}∑N2
j=1Qt,it,j
. (1)
After obtaining the reward signal yt, Player 2 computes importance-weighted reward estimates for
all policies and uses an exponential weighting scheme. Essentially, Player 2 tries to run EXP4, but
is constrained by the fact that recommendations that would have been given by policies of Player 1
are unknown – except for the policy that Player 1 was told to use.
The key insight is that the updates performed by P2-EXP4 are equivalent to the updates
performed by EXP4 on a related bandit problem with KN1 instead of K actions. This is intuitive
since Player 2 has, in every round, to choose among KN1 policy-action combinations. All results for
EXP4 carry over to P2-EXP4. In particular, for γ > 0, P2-EXP4 is equivalent to EXP4-IX (Neu,
2015).
6 When the machine makes treatment recommendations
Instead of providing contextual information, the machine might assist the human by making treatment
recommendations. In our medical example, this means that the machine directly recommends which
medicine to give, or whether to perform a surgery. The doctor remains the final decision maker,
and she has two options. For one, she can decide to trust the machine and take the action that it
suggested. Alternatively, she can override the machine and do something else. How should the doctor
decide what to do? She would want to consider her private contextual information, and her confidence
in the machine’s recommendation. The doctor needs to figure out which problem instances
to defer to the machine, while the machine explores itself. As we state in Conjecture 4,
we believe that this is a hard problem. The conjecture states that in the worst case, treatment
recommendations are essentially as difficult as the general problem.
6.1 We conjecture that treatment recommendations are difficult
Formally, the case of treatment recommendations corresponds to R = A. Since the difficulty of
bandit problems depends on the number of actions K, one might suspect that restricting the size
of R results in improved rates. Consider the case R = A = {0, 1}. Then, if either N1 = 1 or
N2 = 1, EXP4 allows to bound the expected regret by
√
4T ln(N2) or
√
4T ln(N1), respectively.
Thus, without joint exploration, a lower bound of order O(
√
TN1), like in Theorem 2, cannot hold.
To focus on the coordination problem of joint exploration, consider the case N1 = N2. If the second
player can tell the first player which policy to use, P2-EXP4 allows to bound the expected regret by√
8TN1 ln(N1). Based on a construction in Supplement H, we conjecture that this is tight up to a
constant factor.
Conjecture 4. (Lower bound in the number of policies if R and A are small) Let R =
A = {0, 1} and N1 = N2. We conjecture that there exists a universal constant c > 0 such that
RT ≥ c
√
TN1 lnN1.
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From a theoretical perspective, one might wonder whether interaction terms between K and R
appear in any bound. Beyond the special case R = A = {0, 1} and N1 = N2, this might well be the
case.
7 Improved performance under stronger assumptions
In the previous sections we conducted a worst-case analysis. Now we ask whether there exist
assumptions on the setup of the problem under which the two players can learn more efficiently. We
state a particularly simple and strong condition — policy space independence — which
resolves the coordination problem and allows both players to explore independently.
The rationale is that assumptions on the policy spaces implicitly define how human and machine
relate to each other.
7.1 Fixed allocation of the right to decide
Various researchers have put forward interaction protocols for humans and machines (Raghu et al.,
2019a,b; Wilder et al., 2020; Meresht et al., 2020). Perhaps the simplest interaction protocol that
allows both players to explore efficiently is to use a fixed allocation rule. A fixed allocation rule
allocates every decision to either the human or the machine. In our medical example, this means that
there exists some procedure that determines whether a given case should be decided by the doctor
or the machine (Raghu et al., 2019a). Importantly, this procedure has to be fixed ahead of time
and cannot be learned while the decision makers learn themselves. Fixed allocation rules of special
interest are fixed functions of Z (the human decides who decides), and X (the machine decides who
decides). As a consequence of Theorem 6, we see that players do not need to understand on
what basis the right to decide is allocated in order to explore efficiently.
7.2 Beyond the worst case, we can have efficient exploration
We give the following general definition. In Supplement F, we detail how fixed allocation rules result
in policy space independence regardless of the distribution D.
Definition 5 (Policy Space Independence). We say that the two policy spaces Π1 and Π2 are
independent with respect to D if, for all f1, f2 ∈ Π1 and g1, g2 ∈ Π2,
Y
(
g1(f1(x), z)
)− Y (g1(f2(x), z)) = Y (g2(f1(x), z)))− Y (g2(f2(x), z)).
Subject to policy space independence, we have efficient exploration.
Theorem 6 (Logarithmic regret under Policy Space Independence). Under policy space
independence, if both players explore independently using EXP4,
RT ≤
√
8T max{K, |R|} ln(max{N1, N2}).
Under policy space independence, the joint regret is controlled by the sum of two player-wise
regret terms. The formal proof is in Supplement E.
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8 Discussion
To us, the idea that humans and machines can have different information regarding the same problem
has great intuitive appeal. That humans do not understand how machines decide is sometimes
referred to as opacity (Leonelli, 2020). Among others, our model is able to capture the idea
that humans and machines have different context and don’t know the other arrives at
decisions. An obvious limitation of our approach is that we abstract away from how humans
actually make decisions. Indeed, the question of how humans interact with machines is of great
practical importance (Dietvorst et al., 2015). However, this limitation does not matter insofar as we
are interested in what is possible at all.4
Apart from policy space independence, we did not touch upon the question of how the policy
spaces should be designed. Indeed, the policy spaces and the space or recommendations are design
decisions that allow us to specify how human and machine interact. A wide array of potential
interaction protocols between humans and machines can be studied by making specific
assumptions on the policy spaces. In particular, although we stress the importance of the
human as the final decision maker, it is possible to dispose of her by making the right assumption
(endowing her with only the identity map from treatment recommendations to actions).
As such, we believe that our model can be a fruitful basis for the study of various
interaction protocols between humans and machines. In this regard, it remains an important
open question whether there are weaker assumptions than policy space independence that allow for
efficient learning. As long as one is unable to state an assumption that resolves the lower
bound for the machine, our results imply that one should be careful with machine
exploration in human-machine decision contexts. To further underline the flexibility of our
model, we note that it very well possible to assume that humans and machines observe the same
contextual information. For this scenario, we have seen in Section 4 that it becomes important
whether the machine is also able to forecast human behavior.
From a technical perspective, one might want to drop the i.i.d. assumption and consider an
adversarial version of our model where contexts and payoffs are determined, ahead of time, by an
adversary. Moreover, our model could be extended to more than two decision makers, for example
to study a privacy setup where multiple computers coordinate on a decision without revealing their
private information.
Many questions around the human-machine relation remain far from resolved. It has been noted
that as machines continue to improve, there will be an increased pressure towards automation,
entailing different kinds of trade-offs (Froomkin et al., 2019; Grote and Berens, 2020). To study
the dynamics of automated decision making in a versatile environment such as medicine, and to
move beyond our example doctor with her computer monitor, might be a fruitful avenue for future
research.
4In Theorem 3, we show that subject to efficient exploration by the human, there is nothing smart that the
machine can do. Whether this holds true if the machine interacts with real human decision makers, who might explore
less efficiently, is an open question.
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A Definitions
Let H1,t ∈ (X ×R×A× [0, 1])t and H2,t ∈ (R×Z×A× [0, 1])t be the histories of Player 1 and Player
2, respectively. Let D(X) denote the space of probability distributions over a space X, and F(X) the
set of all finite subsets of X. An algorithm A is a pair A = (A1, A2) of two collections of measurable
functions A1 = (A1,t)Tt=1 and A2 = (A2,t)Tt=1. For t = 1, we have A1,1 : F(RX ) × X → D(R) and
A2,1 : F(AR×Z)×R×Z → D(A). For t = 2, . . . , T , we have A1,t : F(RX )× X ×H1,t−1 → D(R)
and A2,t : F(AR×Z) × R × Z × H2,t−1 → D(A). In Section 5, we allow Player 2 to tell Player
1 which policy to use. This means that there is an additional collection of measurable functions
(A3,t)
T
t=1 with A3,1 : F(AR×Z) → D({1, . . . , N1}) and A3,t : F(AR×Z) ×H2,t−1 → D({1, . . . , N1})
for t = 2, . . . , T . These functions specify the (possibly randomized) policies that Player 2 tells Player
1 to use. A1 consists of the fixed functions that implement the said policy choices for the first player.
Additionally, the history of Player 2 and domain of functions in A2 contain the policy that Player 1
was told to use.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Both players privately label their policies from 0, . . . , N1 − 1 and 0, . . . , N2 − 1. Before the
game starts, both players agree on a deterministic strategy for solving an N -armed stochastic bandit
problem. In round t, where arm 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 is to be pulled in the N -armed stochastic bandit
problem, for i = a ·N2 + b with 0 ≤ b < N2, Player 1 plays policy a and Player 2 plays policy b.
Since a deterministic strategy determines the next arm to be pulled solely on the basis of past pulled
arms and obtained rewards, both players know which of the N arms is to be pulled in each round.
Agreeing on 1-UCB allows the two players to bound the minimax regret by O(
√
TN ln(T )) (Bubeck
and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012).
C Proof of Theorem 2
C.1 Proof with unknown context
Proof. The idea is to construct a decision problem where the first player has to solve an N1-armed
stochastic Bernoulli bandit. The result then follows from the lower bound for stochastic Bernoulli
bandits (e.g. Exercise 15.4 in Lattimore and Szepesvari (2019)). Note that Player 2 has only a single
policy, i.e. Π2 = {g}. Thus, the assumption that Player 2 only plays actions that are suggested by
policies in Π2 effectively fixes A2, the algorithm of the second player.
Let (X1t, . . . , XN1,t) ∈ {0, 1}N1 be the payoffs associated with an N1-armed stochastic Bernoulli
bandit in round t. By assumption K = 2, so A = {1, 2}. Player 1 does not need to receive any
context, so let X = {∅}. Choose R = {1, . . . , N1} and Π1 = {fi|fi = i, i = 1, . . . , N1}. That is Player
1 has N1 policies, and policy fi constantly suggests recommendation i. In effect, recommendations
and policies are really the same, namely the arms of a stochastic bandit. Let Z = {0, 1}N1 and
Π2 = {g} with g(r, z) = 1+zr. For simplicity, let the payoff of Action 1 be 0 in all rounds. Conversely,
let the payoff Action 2 be 1 in all rounds. Let the context vector zt of Player 2 be given by the
payoffs associated with the Bernoulli bandit, i.e. zt = (X1t, . . . , XN1,t).
In round t, when arm i ∈ {1, . . . , N1} of the Bernoulli bandit has payoff Xit, Player 2 assigns
recommendation i to action 1 +Xit. This results in a reward of Xit. Thus, in round t, where Player
1 chooses recommendation rt ∈ {1, . . . , N1}, the observes reward is Xrt,t. To sum up, in every round,
Player 1 incurs the reward of one of the arms of the Bernoulli bandit, and this arm can be freely
chosen by choosing the recommendation. Since zt is not observed by Player 1, the payoffs off all
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other arms of the Bernoulli bandit remain unknown. Every algorithm for Player 1 gives rise to an
algorithm for stochastic Bernoulli bandits and vice-versa, and we obtain the lower bound.
C.2 Proof with unknown policy
Proof. As above, let A = {1, 2} and R = {1, . . . , N1}. Let (X1t, . . . , XN1,t) ∈ {0, 1}N1 be the payoffs
associated with an N1-armed stochastic Bernoulli bandit in round t. Now, in every round, both
players receive the same context vector x ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. The recommendations of policies of Player
1 are as before and independent of the context vector, Π1 = {fi|fi = i, i = 1, . . . , N1}.
The important part is the policy of Player 2, which is based on a function gˆ : {1, . . . ,M} →
{0, 1}N1 . Instead of obtaining the payoffs of the Bernoulli bandit directly as contextual information,
Player 2 now uses the private function gˆ to obtain these payoffs from x. Naturally, gˆ cannot be
known to Player 1. As above, the policy of Player 2 is given by g(r, x) = 1 + gˆ(x)r and action payoffs
are fixed to 0 and 1.
Let the context vector be uniformly distributed over {1, . . . ,M}. We have to make sure that the
same context vectors do not appear too often, since otherwise the first player could start to infer the
payoffs associated with them. By choosing M large enough, context vectors up to time T are unique
with probability arbitrarily close to 1.
We still have to specify how to choose gˆ as a function from {1, . . . ,M} to {0, 1}N1 . For N1 and
M fixed, there are only finitely many of these functions. In order to realize a single desired Bernoulli
bandit, draw gˆ according to the probability distribution Dˆ given by
PDˆ(gˆ) =
M∏
i=1
P
(
(X11, . . . , XN1,1) = gˆ(i)
)
.
In other words, for all i = 1, . . . ,M , the distribution of gˆ(i) over {0, 1}N1 is exactly that of the
Bernoulli bandit.
By the same argument as in the prove with unknown context, if gˆ is drawn according to Dˆ,
Player 1 has to solve the Bernoulli bandit given by (X1t, . . . , XN1,t). Now recall that the minimax
regret is given by
RT = inf
A1
sup
D
sup
|Π1|=N1
sup
|Π2|=1
RegT .
In particular,
sup
|Π2|=1
RegT ≥ sup
Dˆ
Egˆ∼Dˆ
[
RegT
]
,
which shows the lower bound in terms of the worst-case expected regret for N1-armed stochastic
Bernoulli bandits.
D Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Recall the EXP4 algorithm, reproduced in Figure D.1. The idea of the proof is as follows. In
P2-EXP4, Player 2 maintains a probability distribution over the space off all policy combinations Π
and performs importance-weighted updates. Player 2 does not know the policy space and context of
Player 1. Therefore, in every round, he only obtains information on policy combinations where fit ,
the function that the first player actually played, is present. This restricts Player 2 and does not
allow him to perform the sames updates as EXP4. However, assume that all policy combinations
where fit is not present had suggested different actions than the policy combinations where fit
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EXP4
Parameters: η > 0, γ > 0
Initialization: Vector Q1 ∈ [0, 1]N with Q1i = 1N
For each t = 1, ..., T
1. Receive context xt
2. Choose action at according to ptk =
∑N
i=1Qti1{pii(xt)=k}.
3. Receive reward yt and estimate yˆtk = 1− 1{at=k}ptk+γ (1− yt)
4. Propagates rewards to experts Yˆti = yˆt,pii(xt)
5. Player 2 updates Qt using exponential weighting
Qt+1,i =
exp
(
ηYˆti
)
Qti∑
j exp
(
ηYˆtj
)
Qtj
Figure D.1: EXP4. Adapted from Algorithm 11 in Lattimore and Szepesvari (2019).
is present. In this case, the updates in P2-EXP4 would be equivalent to the updates of EXP4.
Therefore, we now construct a bandit problem where two different policies of Player 1 never suggest
the same action, and show that Algorithm 1 is equivalent to EXP4 on this related bandit problem.
Consider the adversarial contextual bandit problem with KN1 actions and policy space
Π˜ =
{
hi,j
∣∣i = 1, . . . , N1, j = 1, . . . , N2,
hi,j : X × Z → {1, . . . ,KN1},
hi,j(x, z) = (i− 1)K + gj(fi(x), z)
}
.
This policy space consists of N policies, and there exists a natural bijection I between Π˜ and Π
given by hi,j 7→ gj(fi(·), ·). Let the adversarial payoffs of this new problem be a function of the
(adversarial or i.i.d.) payoffs of the original problem, namely
x˜t = (xt, zt)
and
Y˜t(k) = Yt
(
1 + ((k − 1)modK)
)
,
for all t = 1, . . . , T and k = 1, . . . ,KN1. Here Yt ∈ [0, 1]A contains the payoffs of the original
problem, and Y˜t ∈ [0, 1]{1,...,KN1} the payoffs of the new problem. By construction,
Y˜t
(
hi,j(x˜t)
)
= Yt
(
gj(fi(xt), zt)
)
.
Therefore,
max
p˜i∈Π˜
T∑
t=1
Y˜t
(
p˜i(x˜t)
)
= max
pi∈Π
T∑
t=1
Yt
(
pi(xt, zt)
)
. (2)
We are now going to show that P2-EXP4 is equivalent to EXP4(-IX) on this adversarial contextual
bandit problem. In this proof, we denote all variables related this problem and EXP4 with a ∼. For
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example, a˜t is the action chosen by EXP4 in round t, resulting in a payoff of y˜t. Since both P2-EXP4
and EXP4 are randomized, equivalence means that there exists a coupling of the random variables
drawn by both algorithms under which, in all rounds, the probability distribution Qt maintained
by P2-EXP4 is the probability distribution Q˜t maintained by EXP4 (with respect to bijection I),
a˜t = (it − 1)K + at and y˜t = yt.
We proceed by induction over t. The induction hypothesis is that equivalence holds up to round
t. This is obviously true in the first round since both Qt and Q˜t are initialized to be uniform. In
round t, EXP4 chooses an action a˜t ∈ {1, . . . ,KN1}. This action a˜t can be uniquely written as
a˜t = (ˆit − 1)K + aˆt for some iˆt ∈ {1, . . . , N1} and aˆt ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. By construction, it is exactly
policies hi,1, . . . , hi,N2 that suggest actions
(i− 1)K + 1, . . . , iK.
Hence,
P
(
iˆt = i
)
=
N2∑
j=1
Qt,ij = P(it = i),
where the first equality is due to the induction hypothesis and the second due to the definition of qti
in P2-EXP4. Since they have the same distribution, iˆt and it can be perfectly coupled. Additionally,
and already subject to this coupling,
P(aˆt = k | it = i) = P(a˜t = (i− 1)K + k)P(it = i)
=
∑N2
j=1Qt,ij1
{
hi,j(x˜t)=(i−1)K+k
}∑N2
j=1Qt,ij
= P(at = k | it = i)
where we used the definition of at in Equation (1) of the main paper and the fact that
hi,j(x˜t) = (i− 1)K + k ⇐⇒ gj(fi(xt), zt) = k.
Thus, conditional on it, aˆt and at have the same distribution. Therefore, aˆt and at can be perfectly
coupled, too, and we arrive at a˜t = (it − 1)K + at. From the definition of Y˜t, it follows that y˜t = yt.
It remains to show that the update Qt → Qt+1 in P2-EXP4 agrees with EXP4. We have to show
that Yˆt in P2-EXP4 agrees with the importance-weighted reward estimates of EXP4. We distinguish
three cases. The first case is i = it and gj(fi(xt), zt) = at. Here it holds that
Yˆt,ij = 0 + 1− 1
qt,it pt,at + γ
(1− yt)
= 1− 1
p˜tk + γ
(1− y˜t).
The second case is i = it and gj(fi(xt), zt) 6= at. Here it holds that Yˆt,ij = 0 + 1 = 1. The third case
is i 6= it. Here it holds that Yˆt,ij = 1 + 0 = 1, too. In all three cases, the update agrees exactly with
EXP4.
We have shown that
∑T
t=1 yt =
∑T
t=1 y˜t. Subtracting this from (2), we see that
max
pi∈Π
T∑
t=1
Yt
(
pi(xt, zt)
)
−
T∑
t=1
yt = max
p˜i∈Π˜
T∑
t=1
Y˜t
(
p˜i(x˜t)
)
−
T∑
t=1
y˜t. (3)
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From the analysis of EXP4, e.g. from Theorem 18.1 in Lattimore and Szepesvari (2019), we know
that
E
(
max
p˜i∈Π˜
T∑
t=1
p˜i(x˜t)−
T∑
t=1
y˜t
)
≤
√
2TKN1 ln(N1N2)
for γ = 0 and η =
√
2 log(N1N2)/(TKN1), which implies the desired bound.
E Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Assume that |R| < ∞, otherwise the bound is vacuous. Let f1 and f2 be two policies
of Player 1. In general, the expected regret under f1 and f2 depends on the policy choice of
Player 2. Specifically, there might be g1 and g2 such that Y
(
g1(f1(x), z)
)
> Y
(
g1(f2(x), z)
)
and
Y
(
g2(f1(x), z)
)
< Y
(
g2(f2(x), z)
)
. Let pi? = (g?, f?) be an optimal policy combination. Under policy
space independence, the quantities
Reg(f) = Y
(
g(f?(x), z)
)− Y (g(f(x), z))
and
Reg(g) = Y
(
g?(f(x), z)
)− Y (g(f(x), z))
are well-defined. Moreover,
Y
(
pi?
)− Y (g(f(x), z)) = Reg(g) + Reg(f).
That both players explore independently using EXP4 means the following. Player 2 uses EXP4 on
A with η1 =
√
2 log(N2)/(TK) and γ1 = 0. Player 1 considers recommendations as actions and
uses EXP4 on R with η2 =
√
2 log(N1)/(T |R|) and γ2 = 0. In round t, there exist policies fit
and gjt such that rt = fit(xt) and at = gjt(fit(xt), zt). Player 1 solves the adversarial contextual
bandit problem with context xt, action space R and policy space Π1. Player 2 solves the adversarial
contextual bandit problem with context (rt, zt), action space A and policy space Π2. Player 1
provides adversarial context for Player 2, and Player 2 provides adversarial payoff for Player 1.
Because of policy space independence, this independent exploration strategy also controls the joint
expected regret.
First note that it and jt are functions of the history and can be considered drawn before the
tuple (xt, zt, Yt). The expected regret in round t is given by
E(xt,zt,Yt)∼D
[
Yt(g?(f?(xt), zt)− Yt(gjt(fit(xt), zt))
]
= Y
(
g?(f?(x), z)
)− Y (gjt(fit(x), z)).
Making use of policy space independence, the right hand side can be rewritten as
Y
(
g?(f?(x), z)
)− Y (g?(fit(x), z))+ Y (g?(fit(x), z))− Y (gjt(fit(x), z))
= Y
(
gjt(f?(x), z)
)− Y (gjt(fit(x), z))+ Y (g?(fit(x), z))− Y (gjt(fit(x), z)).
Summing over t, the expected regret is given by
RegT =
T∑
t=1
[
Y
(
gjt(f?(x), z)
)− Y (gjt(fit(x), z))]
+
T∑
t=1
[
Y
(
g?(fit(x), z)
)− Y (gjt(fit(x), z))].
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The first sum is the expected regret in the adversarial contextual bandit problem of the first player.
The second sum is the expected regret in the adversarial contextual bandit problem of the second
player. From the analysis of EXP4, e.g. from Theorem 18.1 in Lattimore and Szepesvari (2019), we
obtain
T∑
t=1
[
Y
(
gjt(f?(x), z)
)− Y (gjt(fit(x), z))] ≤√2T |R| lnN1
and
T∑
t=1
[
Y
(
g?(fit(x), z)
)− Y (gjt(fit(x), z))] ≤√2TK lnN2,
which implies the desired bound.
F Fixed allocation rules
We formalize the example given in Section 7.1. Let R = A (treatment recommendations), D : Z 7→
{0, 1} (the human decides who decides), Π˜2 : Z → A (the human’s own decision rules) and
Π2 = {g|g = D(z)g˜(z) + (1−D(z))r, g˜ ∈ Π˜2}.
Here r = f(x) where f ∈ Π1 is the decision rule used by the machine. Now, for all f ∈ Π1 and
g ∈ Π2, and all distributions D,
Y (g(f(x), z)) = E(x,y,z)∼D[Y (g(f(x), z))]
= P(D(z) = 0)E[Y (g(f(x), z))|D(z) = 0] + P(D(z) = 1)E[Y (g(f(x), z))|D(z) = 1]
= P(D(z) = 0)E[Y (f(x))|D(z) = 0] + P(D(z) = 1)E[Y (g˜(z))|D(z) = 1].
Thus,
Y (g1(f1(x), z))− Y (g1(f2(x), z)) = P(D(z) = 0)E[Y (f1(x))− Y (f2(x))|D(z) = 0]
= Y (g2(f1(x), z))− Y (g2(f2(x), z))
for all f1, f2 ∈ Π1, g1, g2 ∈ Π2 and all distributions D. In the key step of the derivation, we did not
use the fact that D was a (measurable) function of Z. Indeed, the sample space can be partitioned
with respect to any event D.
G Remarks on the additional assumption in Theorem 2
In order to drop the assumption that Player 2 only plays actions that are suggested by policies in
Π2, the constructions that we used in Section C have to be extended in two ways.
First, action payoffs can no longer be fixed. This can be solved by, in every round, randomly
drawing an action to give a payoff of 1 and setting the payoff of the other action to 0. Thus, choosing
an action independent of context and policy space results in an expected payoff of 0.5. This is no
better than the expected payoff of a random arm of a worst-case Bernoulli bandit (where the optimal
arm has payoff 0.5 + ∆ for some ∆ > 0).
Second, Player 2 must not be able to deduce the relation between policies and recommendations.
If Player 2 knew which policies suggest which recommendations, Player 2 could effectively learn for
Player 1. Note that Player 2 does always know the relation between recommendations and actions.
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The idea is to randomize the relation between policies and recommendations. For this, let the policies
of Player 1 depend on a context x ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Let this x be uniform and M large enough such
that every context appears only once. For every value of x, randomly draw a permutation pix ∈ SN1 .
Given context x, policy fi recommends pix(i). This means that policies of Player 1 make random
recommendations, subject to the constraint that all recommendations are different. In the first proof
of Theorem 2 (unknown context), let the context vector z of Player 2 be permuted accordingly such
that every policy still gets the same payoff as it would in the original construction (here we also
take into account the randomly drawn action payoffs). In the second proof of Theorem 2 (unknown
policy), let the policy of Player 2 encode the appropriately permuted payoffs.
Even though this construction is no longer formally equivalent to stochastic Bernoulli bandits,
we think it makes clear that the additional assumption in Theorem 2 is not what drives the result.
H Remarks on Conjecture 4
An intuitive argument for Conjecture 4 is as follows. Consider the problem of Player 1. Even
if R = {0, 1}, the payoff that results from a recommendation still depends on the policy choice
of Player 2. In the worst case, the payoffs that result from the same recommendation under two
different policies of Player 2 are completely unrelated. Then, from the perspective of Player 1,
recommendations under two different policies of Player 2 are distinct. Thus, there are effectively
2N1 possible recommendations, and the conjecture is the EXP4 bound for Player 1.
We now state a class of problem instances that we believe is worst-case. In every round, let
one action give a payoff of 0 and the other a payoff of 1. Randomly decide in every round which
action gives the payoff of 1. Choose the context vector and policy class of Player 1 such that he
uniformly receives one of the 2N1 possible expert recommendations in every round. Ahead of time,
select a policy of Player 1 and Player 2, respectively (the optimal policies). In every round, a policy
for Player 2 gives a map R → A. With R = A = {0, 1}, there are 4 possible maps that we denote
by (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1). Here (1, 0) is the map that maps recommendation 0 to Action
1 and recommendation 1 to action 0. For the optimal policy of Player 2, let the relation between
recommendations and actions be such that every policy of Player 1 except the optimal policy receives
an expected payoff of 0.5, and the optimal policy receives an expected payoff of 0.5 + ∆. This can
be achieved as follows. In round t, where the optimal policy recommends rt, map recommendation
rt to the action with a payoff of 1 with probability 0.5 + ∆. Similarly, map recommendation 1− rt
to the action with a payoff of 1 with probability 0.5−∆. Note that since context vectors of Player 1
are drawn uniformly at random, each policy makes the same recommendation as the optimal policy
exactly half of the time. For all other policies of Player 2, draw one of the 4 possible maps from
recommendations to actions according to
P
(
(0, 0)
)
= 0.25−∆2, P((1, 0)) = 0.25 + ∆2
P
(
(0, 1)
)
= 0.25 + ∆2, P
(
(1, 1)
)
= 0.25−∆2.
This distribution is chosen such that all other policies have the same marginal distribution over the
maps from recommendations to actions as the optimal policy.
To solve an instance of this problem class, an algorithm has to efficiently identify the pair of
optimal policies. Let us now quickly outline why we think that this is a difficult problem. Imagine
that in every round, both players choose a policy according to some decision rule. If both players
choose their optimal policy, the expected payoff both policies is 0.5 + ∆. However, should any of the
two players not choose their optimal policy, the expected payoff of all policies of the other player is
0.5 (also for the optimal policy of the other player). Now consider what happens in the first round
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of the game. Assume that both players choose a policy uniformly at random (note that uniformly
choosing recommendations, maps or actions does not reveal any information at all). If Player 1
chooses a policy uniformly at random, the expected payoff for the optimal policy of Player 2 is
0.5 + ∆N1 . Similarly, if the second player chooses a policy uniformly at random, the expected payoff
for the optimal policy of the first player is 0.5 + ∆N1 . Thus, at least in the first round, the magnitude
of the signal is ∆N1 , while the regret remains to be ∆. To roughly gauge the implications for the
regret, assume that the first player continues to play policies at random while the second player uses
EXP4. The regret guarantee of EXP4 is
√
4T lnN1. However, this regret applies to the weakened
signal where the per-round regret is ∆N1 instead of ∆. The actual regret is N1-times larger, namely
N1
√
2T lnN1.
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